AI summary · arXiv: 2611.13616v1 · q-fin.TR

Optimal Trading Speed on Blockchain

Ruizhe Jia, Shihao Yu
Original paper Submitted to arXiv on 10 Nov. 2026 License: NONEXCLUSIVE-DISTRIB 1.0 Also in: fr

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The essentials

The paper shows that faster blockchain execution shifts arbitrage rents toward arbitrageurs and can let active liquidity providers avoid toxic trades, while reducing pool depth beyond an intermediate speed.

Question

How does block speed affect competition for transaction priority, liquidity provision, and the depth and quality of blockchain-based markets? The paper asks whether faster execution improves liquidity or instead redistributes rents and weakens passive liquidity supply.

Method

The authors develop an equilibrium model with two arbitrageurs, passive liquidity providers, one active provider, liquidity traders, and a sequencer; block arrivals follow a Poisson process with rate B, and transaction latency has rate λ. They test its predictions using a difference-in-differences design around Base’s July 2025 Flashblocks upgrade, which shortened the effective interval from two seconds to 200 milliseconds, comparing the Uniswap v3 WETH–USDC 5 bp pool on Base with Arbitrum using on-chain data and Binance order-book snapshots from May to September 2025.

Findings

  • Result In the model, faster blocks reduce the sequencer’s share of arbitrage rents and increase the share retained by arbitrageurs.
    See the passage in the paper
    The sequencer’s share of the arbitrage prize and the arbitrageurs’ combined share are $$s(B)=\frac{\lambda}{B+\lambda},\qquad 1-s(B)=\frac{B}{B+\lambda}.$$
  • Result After Flashblocks, the difference-in-differences estimate shows a 3.26-basis-point fall in blockchain fees and a 2.73-basis-point rise in net arbitrage markout.
    See the passage in the paper
    The raw markout falls by $0.53$ bps but is not statistically significant; the blockchain fee falls by far more, $3.26$ bps; and the net markout therefore rises by $2.73$ bps.
  • Result The active Base liquidity provider rebalanced faster, reduced exposure to toxic flow relative to the pool, and improved her per-dollar net payoff.
    See the passage in the paper
    Her per-dollar net payoff rises by $0.73$ bps on Base relative to Arbitrum, shifting from approximately break-even ($0.26$ bps) to clearly positive ($1.28$ bps).
  • Result The model predicts that pool depth peaks at a unique intermediate block rate and declines at sufficiently high speeds.
    See the passage in the paper
    Depth has a unique global maximum at an intermediate block rate $B_{d}<B_{2}$.
  • Result In the Base comparison, faster blocks coincided with closer price tracking but lower depth, wider effective spreads, and lower volume.
    See the passage in the paper
    The time-weighted average deviation falls by $0.11$ bps on Base relative to Arbitrum.

Limitations

  • The empirical design studies one pool and one upgrade, and the authors do not establish the liquidity-maximizing block rate or a welfare effect.
    See the passage in the paper
    The evidence does not locate the liquidity-maximizing block rate, and we draw no welfare conclusion.
  • The difference-in-differences interpretation depends on a counterfactual parallel-trends assumption that the diagnostic plots cannot establish.
    See the passage in the paper
    These plots describe the observed time patterns; they do not establish the counterfactual parallel-trends assumption.
  • The active-provider evidence is based on a small cohort: one Base address and four Arbitrum addresses.
    See the passage in the paper
    These filters leave one Base address and four Arbitrum addresses.

Why it matters

The authors argue that blockchain execution speed is not neutral: it affects both the allocation of ordering rents and the incentives of active and passive liquidity providers. For market design, faster blocks can improve price discovery while leaving a thinner pool, a trade-off they say matters for AMM markets, including tokenized securities.

Written by AI from the paper. Passages are checked word for word against the text we analysed; the rest may contain errors.

AI-generated keywords: blockchain execution speed arbitrage liquidity provision automated market makers difference-in-differences

Read further

  • Comprehensive Summary
  • Layman's Summary
  • Blog article
  • Original abstract
The paper examines how faster blockchain execution affects arbitrage, liquidity provision, and the depth available to traders. Its central argument is that block speed changes not only how quickly trades execute but also how participants compete for transaction priority. Shorter block intervals increase the chance that an arbitrageur’s trade executes before a rival arrives, reducing priority-fee competition. They also give active liquidity providers more opportunities to withdraw before arbitrageurs trade against stale prices, potentially disadvantaging passive providers who remain exposed. The authors develop a theoretical model in which blocks arrive randomly, two arbitrageurs compete to trade against stale automated market maker (AMM) prices, and one active liquidity provider can withdraw and redeposit capital. Liquidity traders’ transactions may expire before execution, so faster blocks can increase the number of fee-generating trades that reach the pool. Passive capital enters until its expected returns cover its holding costs and arbitrage losses. The model predicts that faster blocks shift a greater share of arbitrage profits from the sequencer to arbitrageurs. It also predicts that an active provider can eventually cream-skim by avoiding some arbitrage losses while continuing to earn fees, and that total pool depth peaks at an intermediate block speed. The empirical analysis treats Base’s July 2025 Flashblocks launch as a quasi-experiment. Flashblocks reduced Base’s effective execution interval from two seconds to 200 milliseconds while retaining priority-gas-auction ordering within blocks. The authors compare the Uniswap v3 WETH–USDC pool on Base before and after the change with the corresponding pool on Arbitrum, whose execution rules remained unchanged during the sample. Their difference-in-differences analysis combines on-chain pool and liquidity-position records with Binance order-book prices. The authors acknowledge that the design relies on a comparison-chain counterfactual and assess it using trend plots, alternative event windows, and placebo tests. The arbitrage evidence is consistent with weaker competition for transaction priority. For the largest arbitrage trades, estimated gas bids fell by 73% after Flashblocks. The decline increased with trade size, while smaller trades showed no comparable change. Blockchain fees per dollar traded fell by 3.26 basis points, while the change in pre-fee arbitrage markout was a statistically insignificant decline of 0.53 basis points. As a result, net markout rose by 2.73 basis points. Descriptive daily figures show that Base’s gross arbitrage profit fell from about $10,200 to $7,200, while net profit rose from $4,500 to $6,300 because fee savings more than offset the smaller gross opportunity. The estimated fee share of gross profit declined from 56% to 12%. This is an upper bound on the sequencer’s own share, since some fees cover transaction-data costs. The active Base liquidity provider rebalanced about 66% faster, without a significant relative increase in gas price. Her measured avoidance of toxic flow increased: toxic exposure fell by 8.93 percentage points more than the pool’s toxic-flow share. Her estimated payoff improved by 0.73 basis points per dollar, moving from approximately break-even to positive. Reported mean daily profit rose from about $9 to $652. Meanwhile, pool depth fell by roughly 19%, and the largest provider’s share of liquidity rose by 4.20 percentage points. Effective spreads on trades near one ETH widened by 0.07 basis points, or about 47%, while volume declined by roughly 18%. Price tracking improved, with the measured average price deviation falling by 0.11 basis points. Overall, the findings suggest that faster blocks can improve price alignment and benefit arbitrageurs and active market makers, while making liquidity thinner and trading more costly.

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