Optimal Trading Speed on Blockchain

Authors: Ruizhe Jia, Shihao Yu

Submitted to arXiv on 10 Nov. 2026
Abstract

On blockchain-based exchanges, faster blocks weaken the priority-fee competition among arbitrageurs and shift rents from the block producer to them. Equilibrium liquidity peaks at an interior block speed; beyond a threshold, an active liquidity provider cream-skims and passive capital shrinks. Evidence from the Base Flashblocks upgrade, a tenfold block-speed increase, confirms the predictions. Priority-fee bids decrease sharply and arbitrageurs' net profit rises. The active liquidity provider rebalances faster, avoids toxic flow, and earns a higher profit. Pool depth falls and effective spreads widen despite closer tracking of external prices.

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  1. Related Broader context
    The Importance of Low Latency to Order Book Imbalance Trading Strategies
    David Byrd, Sruthi Palaparthi, Maria Hybinette et al. · 2020 · Trading and Market Microstructure · preprint, not peer reviewed · cited 4 times · AI summary available

    The study measures how access latency affects order-book imbalance strategy profits in a continuous double auction, rather than blockchain priority competition and liquidity.

    Abstract

    There is a pervasive assumption that low latency access to an exchange is a key factor in the profitability of many high-frequency trading strategies. This belief is evidenced by the "arms race" undertaken by certain financial firms to co-locate with exchange servers. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to validate and quantify this assumption in a continuous double auction market with a single exchange similar to the New York Stock Exchange. It is not feasible to conduct this exploration with historical data in which trader identity and location are not reported. Accordingly, we investigate the relationship between latency of access to order book information and profitabili…

  2. Related Another approach to the problem
    Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding in Fair Transaction Ordering
    Akaki Mamageishvili, Mahimna Kelkar, Jan Christoph Schlegel et al. · 2023 · Computer Science and Game Theory · cited 23 times · AI summary available

    Buying Time proposes timestamp-and-bid transaction ordering to limit latency racing, while this paper models how block speed changes priority competition and liquidity.

    Abstract

    We design a practical algorithm for transaction ordering that takes into account both transaction timestamps and bids. The algorithm guarantees that users get their transactions published with bounded delay against a bid, while it extracts a fair value from sophisticated users that have an edge in latency, by moving expenditure from investment in latency improvement technology to bidding. The algorithm creates a score from timestamps and bids, and orders transactions based on the score. We first show that a scoring rule is the only type of rule that satisfies the independence of latency races. We provide an economic analysis of the protocol in an environment of private information, where inv…

  3. Related Broader context
    Temporal Liquidity Crossing for Blockchains: An EIP-1559 Extension for Admission Below the Base Fee
    Duan-Yang-Dan Guo · 2026 · Not summarized yet

    Temporal liquidity markets allocate early execution to transactions that fund later execution, addressing transaction timing and ordering rather than block-speed effects on market liquidity.

    Abstract

    Transactions differ in how their value changes with execution time and relative position. Ethereum's EIP-1559 lets them compete through fee fields, but a fee bid gives no enforceable claim to an earlier position in the block, and no way to express willingness to accept a later one. Its base fee is a hard admission floor. We introduce temporal liquidity markets (TLM), a framework for crossing complementary temporal requirements: transactions seeking early-region execution (consumers) can fund transactions that opt into exclusion from that region (providers). Selected consumers complete within the early region and are ordered among themselves by authorization density, both validator-checked. I…

  4. Related Broader context
    Capital Costs Protect the Network: Mining Gap Dynamics in Proof-of-Work Blockchains Under a Stochastic Mempool
    Hasan Selçuk Kılıç, Nail Akar · 2026 · Not summarized yet

    The paper models fee-driven miner idle periods under stochastic transaction arrivals, whereas this paper studies block speed, arbitrage competition, and liquidity provision.

    Abstract

    Proof-of-Work blockchains increasingly rely on transaction fees to keep miners engaged as block subsidies decline. An immediate outcome of this is that miners may sit idle at the start of a round until enough high-fee transactions accumulate in order to make mining worthwhile. This idle period is known as the mining gap. We model the high-fee transaction backlog as a Lindley-type recursion under a two-tier fee market and use its stationary distribution to characterize the mining gap. Under Bitcoin's difficulty-adjustment mechanism, the expected gap grows strictly with the hashpower active on the network and consumes the entire round as that hashpower grows without bound. A free-entry conditi…

  5. Related Broader context
    Global decentralized stock exchange: an innovative permissioned-blockchain framework for integrated capital markets
    Abdullah M. Al-Awadhi, Humoud Alsabah, Saad Alnahedh et al. · 2026 · Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance · Not summarized yet

    The framework examines liquidity and market design for a permissioned blockchain stock exchange, rather than how block speed affects liquidity in a decentralized exchange.

    Abstract

    This paper aims to propose a regulatory-aware conceptual and theoretical framework for a global decentralized stock exchange built on a permissioned blockchain infrastructure. It examines how integrating trading, clearing, custody and supervisory functions within a unified distributed ledger can enhance efficiency, liquidity and compliance across jurisdictions. The study develops a dual technical–regulatory framework supported by a reduced-form theoretical model grounded in market microstructure and governance theory. It evaluates consensus mechanisms, interoperability, privacy and scalability alongside consortium governance, cross-border oversight, legal recognition of tokenized securities …

  6. Related Broader context
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    Yi-Fan Zhou, Jiang Xiao, Xue-Chao Wang et al. · 2026 · Not summarized yet

    The study analyzes stability of adaptive fees across interconnected chains, while this paper examines how block speed changes priority fees and market liquidity.

    Abstract

    EIP-1559 has become the dominant transaction fee mechanism in permissionless blockchains, regulating scarce block space through an adaptive base fee. The design balances a trade-off between responsiveness to demand fluctuations and stability of long-term resource usage. On a single chain, this trade-off is well understood and empirically stable. In multi-chain systems, however, cross-chain flows introduce delayed economic interactions across otherwise independent fee markets. These interactions alter the control dynamics and create stability risks that existing models do not capture. Deployed systems have already polarized. Polkadot enforces conservative update rates, effectively disabling f…

  7. Related Broader context
    PROF: Protected Order Flow in a Profit-Seeking World
    Kushal Babel, Nerla Jean-Louis, Yan Ji et al. · 2024 · Cryptography and Security · cited 15 times · AI summary available

    PROF designs protected transaction ordering to limit harmful MEV in proposer-builder separation, while this paper studies how faster blocks redistribute arbitrage rents and affect liquidity.

    Abstract

    Users of decentralized finance (DeFi) applications face significant risks from adversarial actions that manipulate the order of transactions to extract value from users. Such actions -- an adversarial form of what is called maximal-extractable value (MEV) -- impact both individual outcomes and the stability of the DeFi ecosystem. MEV exploitation, moreover, is being institutionalized through an architectural paradigm known Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS). This work introduces a system called PROF (PRotected Order Flow) that is designed to limit harmful forms of MEV in existing PBS systems. PROF aims at this goal using two ideas. First, PROF imposes an ordering on a set ("bundle") of privat…

  8. Related Broader context
    Tracking High-Frequency Trading Activity in China and Its Effects on Market Quality
    Li Guo, Frank Weikai Li, Ding Qi et al. · 2026 · Trading and Market Microstructure · AI summary available

    The study uses order-level data to link high-frequency trading activity with market quality, whereas this paper tests how faster blockchain execution changes pool depth and spreads.

    In short

    Exact-match limit orders identify latency-sensitive trading in Shenzhen; faster information delivery increases their prevalence, short-run price variation and adverse selection, while modestly reducing pricing error.

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Updated on 16 November 2026.

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