AI summary · arXiv: 2611.16311v1 · cs.CR

What Does It Cost to Force-Close a Lightning Channel? Evidence from 974,000 Channel Closes, 2018-2026

Saurabh Kumar
Original paper Submitted to arXiv on 12 Nov. 2026 14 pages, 8 figures, 8 tables. Code and aggregate data: https://github.com/bitcoindatalabs/ln-force-close-costs License: NONEXCLUSIVE-DISTRIB 1.0 Also in: fr

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The essentials

Across 973,581 Lightning channel closes from 2018–2026, fee spikes did not trigger force-close waves, while force closes cost more and expose pending payments to delay.

Question

How do Lightning force-close costs and risks vary across fee regimes, and how have anchor outputs performed ahead of the move to zero-fee commitments? The paper also tests whether fee spikes are associated with more force closes and measures how promptly pending payments resolve.

Method

The study scans Bitcoin blocks from January 2018 to October 2026, identifying 973,581 public and unlisted channel closes and tracing the spends of force-close outputs; a separate chain index validates 698,476 comparable public closes. It compares fees, delay and block space across close types and formats, measures HTLC timing and anchor use, and tests fee-spike associations against placebo weeks and shuffled or shifted fee series.

Findings

  • Result Organic public force closes during the nine fee-spike weeks and the following weeks were 0.97 times their level in the four preceding weeks, versus 1.02 for ordinary weeks.
    See the passage in the paper
    Pooled over the 9 spikes, organic public force closes in the spike week and the week after were 0.97 times their level in the four weeks before
  • Result Median force-close fees were 2–6 times the median cooperative-close fee across years, and the broadcaster waited a median 1.7 days to sweep its own balance.
    See the passage in the paper
    Against a cooperative close of the same year it is dear: 2–6 times the median cooperative close in every year.
  • Result In 2023, 18.2% of HTLC timeouts confirmed more than 40 blocks after expiry; in blocks with median fees of at least 50 sat/vB, the share was lower for anchor than pre-anchor channels.
    See the passage in the paper
    When the block median fee rate at expiry was 50 sat/vB or more, 30.5% of pre-anchor HTLC timeouts confirmed more than 40 blocks late, against 20.6% of anchor ones
  • Result Since 2021, the study found 38 forwarding-payment losses in which the upstream HTLC timed out after the downstream HTLC was paid, and in every case the preimage was already on-chain.
    See the passage in the paper
    In 38 of them (0.44 BTC) the upstream HTLC timed out while the downstream one was paid, so the node between them paid out and was not paid; in 100% of those the preimage was already on-chain a median 58 blocks before the upstream timeout confirmed.
  • Authors’ interpretation The authors estimate zero-fee commitments would reduce the anchor mechanism’s block space by 12%, and argue that timely payment resolution during fee spikes is a more important test of the migration.
    See the passage in the paper
    Zero-fee commitments would have taken 152 vB: one pay-to-anchor output, its spend, and a child for the 88% of closes that were not already bumped (Table VII). That is 12% less.

Limitations

  • The chain cannot reveal which party broadcast a force close or fee bumps that failed to confirm, so costs are per channel and unsuccessful bump attempts are unobserved.
    See the passage in the paper
    The chain does not show which party broadcast a force close, so every cost is per channel, both parties together. It shows fee bumps that confirmed, not those that were tried and failed.
  • Private channels are visible only when force-closed, leaving their total number, force-close rate and cooperative closes unmeasured.
    See the passage in the paper
    Private channels appear only when they force close, so their number and their force-close rate are unknown, and their cooperative closes are not in the closing bill.
  • The fee-spike analysis is a within-year association and does not establish that every causal pathway is absent.
    See the passage in the paper
    The fee-spike test is a within-year association; it rules out a large same-week effect, not every causal path.

Why it matters

The authors present the measurements as a baseline for evaluating zero-fee commitments and argue that the migration should be judged by whether time-critical payments resolve before their deadlines during fee spikes. Their results also distinguish the benefit of anchors for HTLC timing from their limited use for commitment fee bumps and the value miners capture from swept P2WSH anchors.

Written by AI from the paper. Passages are checked word for word against the text we analysed; the rest may contain errors.

AI-generated keywords: Lightning Network force closes Bitcoin transaction fees HTLC timeouts anchor outputs

Read further

  • Comprehensive Summary
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  • Original abstract
The paper examines the costs of force-closing Lightning Network channels, how those costs vary with Bitcoin fee conditions, and whether fee spikes are associated with more channel closures or failed payments. It also studies the use of anchor outputs for fee bumps and the potential effects of zero-fee commitments. The authors analyze Bitcoin blocks from January 2018 through October 2026. They identify 973,581 channel closures, including 523,815 force closes, and trace the spending of force-close outputs. They identify public channels using multiple channel records and detect force closes of channels outside those records by the characteristic structure of commitment transactions. They validate their public-channel labels against a separately constructed chain index. Their measurements cover transaction fees, block space, locked-fund delays, HTLC resolution times, and anchor spending. To assess whether fee spikes coincide with more force closes, the authors compare spike periods with ordinary weeks in the same years and run placebo tests that shift the timing of fee data. Force closes became less common among public channels over the study period. Their share of public closures fell from 44% in 2023 to 20% in the first ten months of 2026. Over the same period, the monthly force-close rate declined from 41 to 26 per 1,000 open public channels. The estimated share of channels force-closed within a year also fell, from 35% for channels funded in 2019 to 17% for the 2025 cohort. By 2026, force closes outside the public-channel list outnumbered those inside it by 3.4 to 1, although the unlisted group includes some public channels missing from the authors’ records. Depending on the year, force closes cost two to six times as much in fees as cooperative closes. In 2026, the median public force-close fee was 925 satoshis; it peaked at 14,318 satoshis in 2020. From 2022 onward, force closes also used about three times as much block space as cooperative closes. The broadcaster’s balance was locked for a median of 1.7 days, with some delays lasting longer. Under the authors’ break-even calculation, the cost of this delay outweighed transaction fees only during the low-fee years of 2025 and 2026. Including the funding transaction, the median lifecycle cost of a public channel was 3,435 satoshis. The analysis finds no evidence that fee spikes caused a broad increase in confirmed force closes. During a spike week and the following week, the number of closes was 0.97 times the level in the preceding four weeks, compared with 1.02 during ordinary weeks. Results were similar for pre-anchor and anchor channels. Fee spikes did, however, increase the risk of late HTLC timeout confirmations. In 2023, 18.2% of timeouts confirmed more than 40 blocks after expiry. At fee rates of at least 50 satoshis per virtual byte, the late-confirmation share was 30.5% for pre-anchor channels and 20.6% for anchor channels. Since 2021, the authors identify 38 forwarding-payment losses; in every case, the payment preimage was already on-chain before the upstream timeout. After 2023, anchor outputs were rarely used by channel owners to bump fees. Third parties eventually spent all observed P2WSH anchors, but miners received 87% of their value in 2026. The authors found no third-party sweeps of simple-taproot anchors. They estimate that zero-fee commitments would reduce block space used by the anchor mechanism by only 12%. Their greater potential benefits are eliminating locked anchor value and improving fee flexibility.

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