AI summary · arXiv: 2611.11112v1 · econ.GN

The Effect of the U.S. Federal Production Tax Credit on Negative Energy Prices

Erik P. Johnson, Daniel H. Karney
Original paper Submitted to arXiv on 08 Nov. 2026 License: CC BY 4.0 Also in: fr

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The essentials

The study estimates that the U.S. wind production tax credit increases negative-price risk, but explains only about 10% of negative-price variation, with effects differing sharply across markets.

Question

How much does the federal Production Tax Credit (PTC) for wind cause negative wholesale energy prices, relative to other drivers? The authors also assess the associated environmental benefits during negative-price hours.

Method

The study combines hourly price and load data from five Eastern Interconnection markets with wind-generator eligibility and generation data. Using variation from the PTC’s 10-year eligibility limit and hourly wind variability, it estimates logistic regressions on 419,640 hours, controlling for load, future load, and fixed effects. It also uses dominance analysis to assess explanatory importance and estimates environmental benefits for 2014–2022.

Findings

  • Result In the preferred pooled specification, a 1% increase in PTC-eligible wind generation is associated with a 3.43 percentage-point increase in the probability of a negative energy price.
    See the passage in the paper
    This specification finds an average marginal effect semi-log estimate of 3.43 percentage points for the variable of interest and means increasing PTC-eligible wind generation by 1 percent then increases the probability of a negative energy price by 3.43 percentage points.
  • Result PTC-eligible wind generation accounts for about 10% of the explained variation in negative prices in the pooled analysis.
    See the passage in the paper
    For our preferred specification in Table 2 column [8], we find that 9.99 percent of the variance is explained by $WindGenPTC$ alone.
  • Result The estimated effect varies substantially across markets, with the largest estimate in SPP.
    See the passage in the paper
    The SPP point estimate implies that a 1 percent increase in PTC-eligible wind generation increases the probability of a negative energy price hour by 25.0 percentage points.
  • Result The authors estimate that PTC-related environmental benefits in negative-price hours exceed the estimated PTC-induced generator expenditures overall.
    See the passage in the paper
    This row shows that the PTC creates net benefits across our sample between $286 million and $521 million in negative priced hours due to the PTC.
  • Authors’ interpretation The authors argue that production subsidies are not the primary cause of negative prices in most markets and that transmission and storage expansion may reduce their prevalence more than phasing out subsidies.
    See the passage in the paper
    Consequently, the expansion of electricity storage and transmission capacity will likely have a greater effect on decreasing the prevalence of negative prices than the phase-out of production subsides.

Limitations

  • The empirical analysis focuses on wind and does not estimate effects for large-scale solar because its market penetration is too recent in the available data.
    See the passage in the paper
    Our empirical analysis focuses solely on wind generation since large-scale solar penetration into wholesale electricity markets is a relatively recent development and thus not adequately represented in the available data.
  • Hourly generation for individual wind plants is imputed using an assumption that plants within an ISO share hourly wind conditions.
    See the passage in the paper
    This methodology assumes that each wind plant in an ISO is exposed to the same wind conditions in each hour.
  • The environmental-benefit comparison is restricted to negative-price hours and omits benefits from PTC-supported generation in positive-price hours.

Why it matters

The paper provides causal evidence linking the PTC to negative energy prices while quantifying the comparatively limited pooled contribution and substantial market heterogeneity. The authors argue that other mechanisms matter more in most markets and that transmission and storage may be more consequential for reducing negative prices.

Written by AI from the paper. Passages are checked word for word against the text we analysed; the rest may contain errors.

AI-generated keywords: Production Tax Credit negative electricity prices wind power wholesale electricity markets renewable energy policy

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  • Original abstract
The paper examines whether the U.S. federal Production Tax Credit (PTC) for wind power causes negative wholesale electricity prices and how its influence compares with other factors. Negative prices can arise when electricity supply exceeds demand or when generators have incentives to keep producing despite low or negative prices. The authors focus on the energy component of prices, rather than the full locational marginal price, and study five wholesale markets in the U.S. Eastern Interconnection from 2000 to 2023. The authors first develop a model showing how per-unit subsidies can encourage eligible generators to submit negative bids. A wind generator may accept a price below zero if its subsidy exceeds its production costs. The model also shows that generators facing operating or ramping constraints may bid negatively to preserve the opportunity to earn revenue in later hours, even without a production subsidy. The authors combine hourly market prices and demand data with information on wind generators’ operating dates and monthly output. They estimate hourly output from PTC-eligible wind generators using each market’s hourly wind-generation pattern. Their causal analysis exploits differences across markets and over time in PTC eligibility, which lasts ten years after a generator begins operating, as well as variation in wind output. Logit regressions control for demand, future load, and combinations of time and market fixed effects. The preferred estimate indicates that a 1 percent increase in PTC-eligible wind generation raises the probability of an energy price between zero and the negative value of the PTC by 3.43 percentage points. The authors interpret this result as evidence that the credit contributes causally to negative prices, while emphasizing that its average effect is limited. Their dominance analysis attributes about 10 percent of the variation in negative-price outcomes to PTC-eligible wind generation, with other factors accounting for most of the remainder. The estimated effects vary substantially across markets. The effect is especially large in the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), where a 1 percent increase in eligible wind generation is associated with a 25-percentage-point increase in the probability of a negative price in the relevant range. However, this estimate applies against a relatively low baseline: about 4 percent of SPP prices fall in that range. Estimates for ISO-NE and PJM are close to zero, while those for MISO and NYISO fall between the pooled estimate and the SPP result. The descriptive data also point to causes beyond the PTC. Nearly 18 percent of observed negative-price hours have prices more negative than the PTC alone could induce under the authors’ model. Negative prices are more common when demand is low, and very negative prices appear more likely before demand rises, consistent with ramping constraints. An alternative regression examining prices below the PTC’s negative value finds a smaller association with the credit, further suggesting that other mechanisms matter. For 2014–2022, the authors estimate an upper bound of $369 million in PTC-related generator payments under the pooled analysis, compared with $2.8 billion in total negative-price payments. Accounting for differences among markets raises the estimated upper bound to $570 million. They estimate that emissions reductions during negative-price hours attributed to the PTC generated environmental benefits of $655 million to $1.092 billion, exceeding the estimated costs overall. These benefits are concentrated in SPP, however, and results differ across markets. The findings depend on assumptions about PTC eligibility as a source of exogenous variation and on imputed hourly generation, which assumes that wind plants within a market experience similar hourly wind conditions. The analysis covers only markets and years with the required data, focuses on wind rather than solar, and estimates environmental benefits only during negative-price hours—not across all hours in which supported wind generation operates. The authors conclude that the PTC contributes to negative prices but is usually not their main cause.

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