Covert learning and disclosure

Matteo Escudé

AI summary · arXiv: 2304.02989v1 · econ.TH

Covert learning and disclosure

Matteo Escudé

Original paper Submitted to arXiv on 06 Apr. 2023 License: NONEXCLUSIVE-DISTRIB 1.0

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The essentials

Matteo Escudé presents a model of information acquisition and transmission
The sender's ability to misreport their findings is limited in the model
In equilibrium, the sender only influences the receiver by choosing to remain selectively ignorant rather than deceiving them about their discoveries
The possibility of deception still plays a crucial role in determining what information the sender chooses to acquire and transmit
Escudé explores comparative statics, characterizing how the sender benefits from claims being more verifiable
This affects both sender- and receiver-optimal falsification environments
The research sheds light on how individuals navigate information sharing when they have limited abilities to deceive
It emphasizes the importance of considering deception possibilities even when they do not occur in equilibrium.

Key points written by AI: they may contain errors, check them against the paper.

AI-generated keywords: Deception Information Sharing Equilibrium Commitment Power Verifiable

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Original abstract

In "Covert Learning and Disclosure," Matteo Escudé presents a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport their findings is limited. The study shows that, in equilibrium, the sender only influences the receiver by choosing to remain selectively ignorant rather than deceiving them about their discoveries. However, the possibility of deception still plays a crucial role in determining what information the sender chooses to acquire and transmit. Escudé then explores comparative statics, characterizing how the sender benefits from claims being more verifiable - similar to increasing their commitment power - and how this affects both sender- and receiver-optimal falsification environments. This research sheds light on how individuals navigate information sharing when they have limited abilities to deceive and emphasizes the importance of considering deception possibilities even when they do not occur in equilibrium.

Covert Learning and Disclosure: Exploring the Role of Deception in Information Acquisition and Transmission

In his research paper, “Covert Learning and Disclosure,” Matteo Escudé presents a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport their findings is limited. This study provides insight into how individuals navigate information sharing when they have limited abilities to deceive. The results emphasize the importance of considering deception possibilities even when they do not occur in equilibrium.

The Model

Escudé's model considers two players: a sender who has access to some private information that can be communicated to a receiver through speech or writing, and a receiver who must decide whether or not to believe what they are told. The sender chooses between acquiring more knowledge (learning) or disclosing what they already know (disclosing). The receiver then decides whether or not to trust the sender based on their past behavior.

The study shows that, in equilibrium, the sender only influences the receiver by choosing to remain selectively ignorant rather than deceiving them about their discoveries. However, the possibility of deception still plays a crucial role in determining what information the sender chooses to acquire and transmit.

Comparative Statics

Escudé then explores comparative statics - how changes in parameters affect outcomes - characterizing how the sender benefits from claims being more verifiable - similar to increasing their commitment power - and how this affects both sender-optimal falsification environments as well as those preferred by receivers. He finds that if claims become more verifiable, it increases incentives for senders to learn because it reduces opportunities for deceitful disclosure; however, it also reduces incentives for receivers since there is less uncertainty about what will be disclosed if senders choose learning over disclosure.

Conclusion

This research sheds light on how individuals navigate information sharing when they have limited abilities to deceive and emphasizes the importance of considering deception possibilities even when they do not occur in equilibrium. By exploring comparative statics related to verifiability of claims, Escudé reveals insights into why senders might prefer learning over disclosure under certain circumstances while receivers may prefer greater uncertainty due lack of commitment power from senders

Created on 07 Apr. 2023

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