AI summary · arXiv: 2302.09548v1 · econ.TH
Designing binary social decisions
The essentials
- Majority voting with random checks is a mechanism proposed by Kirneva and Nuñez that fully implements the majority rule for binary social decisions.
- The mechanism involves a simultaneous vote over two options, followed by confirmation of the winner by at least one agent from a random sample of agents voting sequentially.
- If no agent confirms the outcome, a lottery is held to incentivize agents to act truthfully.
- This mechanism reduces the number of stages required for implementation by almost half compared to existing mechanisms.
- Lotteries are introduced into their mechanisms to remove undesirable equilibria where the minority preferred candidate wins due to too many votes for the same option making no agent pivotal.
- Modifications are proposed to ensure truthful reporting and reduce strategic uncertainty in cases where agents have incomplete information or may choose to abstain from voting.
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