The effects of incentives, social norms, and employees' values on work performance

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1. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Corporate Culture and Organizational Fragility

   Matthew Elliott, Benjamin Golub, Matthieu V. Leduc · 2023 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   Complex organizations accomplish tasks through many steps of collaboration among workers. Corporate culture supports collaborations by establishing norms and reducing misunderstandings. Because a strong corporate culture relies on costly, voluntary investments by many workers, we model it as an organizational public good, subject to standard free-riding problems, which become severe in large organizations. Our main finding is that voluntary contributions to culture can nevertheless be sustained, because an organization's equilibrium productivity is endogenously highly sensitive to individual contributions. However, the completion of complex tasks is then necessarily fragile to small shocks t…

2. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   The Core of an Economy with an Endogenous Social Division of Labour

   Robert P. Gilles · 2018 · Économie théorique · Pas encore résumé

   Résumé scientifique

   This paper considers the core of a competitive market economy with an endogenous social division of labour. The theory is founded on the notion of a "consumer-producer", who consumes as well as produces commodities. First, we show that the Core of such an economy with an endogenous social division of labour can be founded on deviations of coalitions of arbitrary size, extending the seminal insights of Vind and Schmeidler for pure exchange economies. Furthermore, we establish the equivalence between the Core and the set of competitive equilibria for continuum economies with an endogenous social division of labour. Our analysis also concludes that self-organisation in a social division of labo…

3. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Artificial Intelligence in the Knowledge Economy

   Enrique Ide, Eduard Talamas · 2023 · Économie théorique · Pas encore résumé

   Résumé scientifique

   How does Artificial Intelligence (AI) affect the organization of work and the structure of wages? We study this question in a model where heterogeneous agents in terms of knowledge--humans and machines--endogenously sort into hierarchical teams: Less knowledgeable agents become "workers" (i.e., execute routine tasks), while more knowledgeable agents become "managers" (i.e., specialize in problem solving). When AI's knowledge is equivalent to that of a pre-AI worker, AI displaces humans from routine work into managerial work compared to the pre-AI outcome. In contrast, when AI's knowledge is that of a pre-AI manager, it shifts humans from managerial work to routine work. AI increases total hu…

4. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Wealth Redistribution and Mutual Aid: Comparison using Equivalent/Nonequivalent Exchange Models of Econophysics

   Takeshi Kato · 2022 · Entropy 2023, 25(2), 224 · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   Given the wealth inequality worldwide, there is an urgent need to identify the mode of wealth exchange through which it arises. To address the research gap regarding models that combine equivalent exchange and redistribution, this study compares an equivalent market exchange with redistribution based on power centers and a nonequivalent exchange with mutual aid using the Polanyi, Graeber, and Karatani modes of exchange. Two new exchange models based on multi-agent interactions are reconstructed following an econophysics approach for evaluating the Gini index (inequality) and total exchange (economic flow). Exchange simulations indicate that the evaluation parameter of the total exchange divi…

5. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Platform-Mediated Competition

   Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey · 2020 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   Cross-group externalities and network effects in two-sided platform markets shape market structure and competition policy, and are the subject of extensive study. Less understood are the within-group externalities that arise when the platform designs many-to-many matchings: the value to agent $i$ of matching with agent $j$ may depend on the set of agents with which $j$ is matched. These effects are present in a wide range of settings in which firms compete for individuals' custom or attention. I characterize platform-optimal matchings in a general model of many-to-many matching with within-group externalities. I prove a set of comparative statics results for optimal matchings, and show how t…

6. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   From Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based Pricing

   Tan Gan, Nicholas Wu · 2023 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has partial information about the product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. We characterize equilibrium mechanisms of this dynamic informed principal problem. The belief gap between the informed seller and the uninformed buyer, coupled with the buyer's learning, gives rise to mechanisms that provide the skeptical buyer with limited access to the product and an option to upgrade if the buyer is swayed by a good experience. Depending on the seller's screening technology, this takes the form of free/discounted trials or tiered pricing, which are prevalent in digital markets. In c…

7. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Gacha Game: When Prospect Theory Meets Optimal Pricing

   Tan Gan · 2022 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   I study the optimal pricing process for selling a unit good to a buyer with prospect theory preferences. In the presence of probability weighting, the buyer is dynamically inconsistent and can be either sophisticated or naive about her own inconsistency. If the buyer is naive, the uniquely optimal mechanism is to sell a ``loot box'' that delivers the good with some constant probability in each period. In contrast, if the buyer is sophisticated, the uniquely optimal mechanism introduces worst-case insurance: after successive failures in obtaining the good from all previous loot boxes, the buyer can purchase the good at full price.

8. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Benefits of marriage as a search strategy

   Davi B. Costa · 2021 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   We propose and investigate a model for mate searching and marriage in large societies based on a stochastic matching process and simple decision rules. Agents have preferences among themselves given by some probability distribution. They randomly search for better mates, forming new couples and breaking apart in the process. Marriage is implemented in the model by adding the decision of stopping searching for a better mate when the affinity between a couple is higher than a certain fixed amount. We show that the average utility in the system with marriage can be higher than in the system without it. Part of our results can be summarized in what sounds like a piece of advice: don't marry the …