Risk measures induced by efficient insurance contracts

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   Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Weyl

   Michael H. Freedman · 2022 · Économie théorique · Pas encore résumé

   Résumé scientifique

   The paper describes a funding mechanism called Quadratic Finance (QF) and deploys a bit of calculus to show that within a very clean and simple linear model QF maximizes social utility. They differentiate the social utility function. The mathematical content of this note is that by taking one further derivative, one may also deduce that QF is the unique solution.

2. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   The Relationship between Consumer Theories with and without Utility Maximization

   Yuhki Hosoya · 2024 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   To study the assumption that the utility maximization hypothesis implicitly adds to consumer theory, we consider a mathematical representation of pre-marginal revolution consumer theory based on subjective exchange ratios. We introduce two axioms on subjective exchange ratio, and show that both axioms hold if and only if consumer behavior is consistent with the utility maximization hypothesis. Moreover, we express the process for a consumer to find the transaction stopping point in terms of differential equations, and prove that the conditions for its stability are equal to the two axioms introduced in the above argument. Therefore, the consumer can find his/her transaction stopping point if…

3. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Wealth Redistribution and Mutual Aid: Comparison using Equivalent/Nonequivalent Exchange Models of Econophysics

   Takeshi Kato · 2022 · Entropy 2023, 25(2), 224 · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   Given the wealth inequality worldwide, there is an urgent need to identify the mode of wealth exchange through which it arises. To address the research gap regarding models that combine equivalent exchange and redistribution, this study compares an equivalent market exchange with redistribution based on power centers and a nonequivalent exchange with mutual aid using the Polanyi, Graeber, and Karatani modes of exchange. Two new exchange models based on multi-agent interactions are reconstructed following an econophysics approach for evaluating the Gini index (inequality) and total exchange (economic flow). Exchange simulations indicate that the evaluation parameter of the total exchange divi…

4. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   From Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based Pricing

   Tan Gan, Nicholas Wu · 2023 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has partial information about the product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. We characterize equilibrium mechanisms of this dynamic informed principal problem. The belief gap between the informed seller and the uninformed buyer, coupled with the buyer's learning, gives rise to mechanisms that provide the skeptical buyer with limited access to the product and an option to upgrade if the buyer is swayed by a good experience. Depending on the seller's screening technology, this takes the form of free/discounted trials or tiered pricing, which are prevalent in digital markets. In c…

5. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Covert learning and disclosure

   Matteo Escudé · 2023 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. In equilibrium, the sender only influences the receiver by choosing to remain selectively ignorant, rather than by deceiving her about the discoveries. Although deception does not occur, I highlight how deception possibilities determine what information the sender chooses to acquire and transmit. I then turn to comparative statics, characterizing in which sense the sender benefits from her claims being more verifiable, showing this is akin to increasing her commitment power. Finally, I characterize sender- and receiver-optimal falsification environments.

6. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Gacha Game: When Prospect Theory Meets Optimal Pricing

   Tan Gan · 2022 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   I study the optimal pricing process for selling a unit good to a buyer with prospect theory preferences. In the presence of probability weighting, the buyer is dynamically inconsistent and can be either sophisticated or naive about her own inconsistency. If the buyer is naive, the uniquely optimal mechanism is to sell a ``loot box'' that delivers the good with some constant probability in each period. In contrast, if the buyer is sophisticated, the uniquely optimal mechanism introduces worst-case insurance: after successive failures in obtaining the good from all previous loot boxes, the buyer can purchase the good at full price.

7. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Optimal Procurement Design: A Reduced Form Approach

   Kun Zhang · 2025 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   Standard procurement models assume that the buyer knows the quality of the good at the time of procurement; however, in many settings, the quality is learned only long after the transaction. We study procurement problems in which the buyer's valuation of the supplied good depends directly on its quality, which is unverifiable and unobservable to the buyer. For a broad class of procurement problems, we identify procurement mechanisms maximizing any weighted average of the buyer's expected payoff and social surplus. The optimal mechanism can be implemented by an auction that restricts sellers to submit bids within specific intervals.

8. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   The effects of incentives, social norms, and employees' values on work performance

   Michael Roos, Jessica Reale, Frederik Banning · 2021 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   This agent-based model contributes to a theory of corporate culture in which company performance and employees' behaviour result from the interaction between financial incentives, motivational factors and endogenous social norms. Employees' personal values are the main drivers of behaviour. They shape agents' decisions about how much of their working time to devote to individual tasks, cooperative, and shirking activities. The model incorporates two aspects of the management style, analysed both in isolation and combination: (i) monitoring efforts affecting intrinsic motivation, i.e. the firm is either trusting or controlling, and (ii) remuneration schemes affecting extrinsic motivation, i.e…