Search Results for « Fairness »

Different beliefs about the fairness of social competition and what determines income inequality influence the redistributive policy chosen in a society. But the composition of income in equilibrium depends on tax policies. We show how the interaction between social beliefs and welfare policies may lead to multiple equilibria or multiple steady states. If a society believes that individual effort determines income, and that all have a right to enjoy the fruits of their effort, it will choose low redistribution and low taxes. In equilibrium, effort will be high and the role of luck will be limited, in which case market outcomes will be relatively fair and social beliefs will be self-fulfilled. If, instead, a society believes that luck, birth, connections, and/or corruption determine wealth, it will levy high taxes, thus distorting allocations and making these beliefs self-sustained as well. These insights may help explain the cross-country variation in perceptions about income inequality and choices of redistributive policies.

We propose measurement modeling from the quantitative social sciences as a framework for understanding fairness in computational systems. Computational systems often involve unobservable theoretical constructs, such as socioeconomic status, teacher effectiveness, and risk of recidivism. Such constructs cannot be measured directly and must instead be inferred from measurements of observable properties (and other unobservable theoretical constructs) thought to be related to them---i.e., operationalized via a measurement model. This process, which necessarily involves making assumptions, introduces the potential for mismatches between the theoretical understanding of the construct purported to be measured and its operationalization. We argue that many of the harms discussed in the literature on fairness in computational systems are direct results of such mismatches. We show how some of these harms could have been anticipated and, in some cases, mitigated if viewed through the lens of measurement modeling. To do this, we contribute fairness-oriented conceptualizations of construct reliability and construct validity that unite traditions from political science, education, and psychology and provide a set of tools for making explicit and testing assumptions about constructs and their operationalizations. We then turn to fairness itself, an essentially contested construct that has different theoretical understandings in different contexts. We argue that this contestedness underlies recent debates about fairness definitions: although these debates appear to be about different operationalizations, they are, in fact, debates about different theoretical understandings of fairness. We show how measurement modeling can provide a framework for getting to the core of these debates.

We incorporate the concept of fairness in a conventional dyadic channel to investigate how fairness may affect channel coordination. We show that when channel members are concerned about fairness, the manufacturer can use a simple wholesale price above her marginal cost to coordinate this channel both in terms of achieving the maximum channel profit and in terms of attaining the maximum channel utility. Thus, channel coordination may not require an elaborate pricing contract. A constant wholesale price will do.

Distributing the spoils of a joint enterprise on the basis of work contribution or relative productivity seems natural to the modern Western mind. But such notions of merit-based distributive justice may be culturally constructed norms that vary with the social and economic structure of a group. In the present research, we showed that children from three different cultures have very different ideas about distributive justice. Whereas children from a modern Western society distributed the spoils of a joint enterprise precisely in proportion to productivity, children from a gerontocratic pastoralist society in Africa did not take merit into account at all. Children from a partially hunter-gatherer, egalitarian African culture distributed the spoils more equally than did the other two cultures, with merit playing only a limited role. This pattern of results suggests that some basic notions of distributive justice are not universal intuitions of the human species but rather culturally constructed behavioral norms.

We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players, but trust contracts that pay a generous wage up front are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts. These results are consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness, and incentives.

Algorithmic decision making systems are ubiquitous across a wide variety of online as well as offline services. These systems rely on complex learning methods and vast amounts of data to optimize the service functionality, satisfaction of the end user and profitability. However, there is a growing concern that these automated decisions can lead, even in the absence of intent, to a lack of fairness, i.e., their outcomes can disproportionately hurt (or, benefit) particular groups of people sharing one or more sensitive attributes (e.g., race, sex). In this paper, we introduce a flexible mechanism to design fair classifiers by leveraging a novel intuitive measure of decision boundary (un)fairness. We instantiate this mechanism with two well-known classifiers, logistic regression and support vector machines, and show on real-world data that our mechanism allows for a fine-grained control on the degree of fairness, often at a small cost in terms of accuracy.

People like to help those who are helping them and to hurt those who are hurting them. Outcomes rejecting such motivations are called fairness equilibria. Outcomes are mutual-max when each person maximizes the other's material payoffs, and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other's payoffs. It is shown that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness equilibrium. If payoffs are small, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of mutual-max and mutual-min outcomes; if payoffs are large, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of Nash equilibria. Several economic examples are considered and possible welfare implications of fairness are explored. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.

Abstract This book argues that the global economy generates significant egalitarian requirements of fairness, independently of humanitarian, human rights, or other justice concerns. Answering both economic and political forms of skepticism about fairness, the book argues that the global economy as we know it is organized by an international social practice in which countries mutually rely upon common markets. This practice of mutual reliance generates shared responsibilities of “structural equity” for how the benefits and burdens of the global economy are distributed across different societies and their respective social classes. These basic responsibilities are characterized by three basic principles. The principles require compensation of people harmed by their exposure to global economic forces through robust social insurance schemes, and equal division of the “gains of trade,” across and within societies, unless still greater gains flow to developing countries. Fairness so calls for strong social insurance schemes, international capital controls, policy flexibility for developing countries, and more, as the “fair price” of free trade.

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior.

We present experimental evidence that promises and threats mitigate the hold‐up problem. While investors rely as much on their own threats as on their trading partner's promises, the latter are more credible. Building on recent work in psychology and behavioural economics, we then present a simple model within which agents are concerned about both fairness and consistency. The model can account for several of our experimental findings. Its most striking implication is that fairmindedness strengthens the credibility of promises to behave fairly, but weakens the credibility of threats to punish unfair behaviour.