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Fairness and Channel Coordination

Tony Haitao Cui (University of Minnesota), Jagmohan Singh Raju (University of Pennsylvania), Z. John Zhang (University of Pennsylvania)

Management Science
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0697 (Business, Management and Accounting)
License: not stated (all rights reserved)

Abstract: We incorporate the concept of fairness in a conventional dyadic channel to investigate how fairness may affect channel coordination. We show that when channel members are concerned about fairness, the manufacturer can use a simple wholesale price above her marginal cost to coordinate this channel both in terms of achieving the maximum channel profit and in terms of attaining the maximum channel utility. Thus, channel coordination may not require an elaborate pricing contract. A constant wholesale price will do.

Published on 01 Aug. 2007