Résultats du processus de synthèse de l'article arXiv : 2304.01945v2

Résumé : Decision making in multi-agent games can be extremely challenging, particularly under uncertainty. In this work, we propose a new sample-based approximation to a class of stochastic, general-sum, pure Nash games, where each player has an expected-value objective and a set of chance constraints. This new approximation scheme inherits the accuracy of objective approximation from the established sample average approximation (SAA) method and enjoys a feasibility guarantee derived from the scenario optimization literature. We characterize the sample complexity of this new game-theoretic approximation scheme, and observe that high accuracy usually requires a large number of samples, which results in a large number of sampled constraints. To accommodate this, we decompose the approximated game into a set of smaller games with few constraints for each sampled scenario, and propose a decentralized, consensus ADMM algorithm to efficiently compute a generalized Nash equilibrium of the approximated game. We prove the convergence of our algorithm and empirically demonstrate superior performance relative to a recent baseline.