Search Results for « Revenue Sharing »

We develop a model of airport revenue sharing in a connecting market where two independent airlines provide complementary flight segments and choose fares and flight frequencies.Because each airline's frequency improves the quality of the connecting itinerary, it generates benefits for both the complementary carrier and the airport that are only partly captured by the airline making the frequency choice.By sharing non-aeronautical revenue with the airlines, the airport can strengthen their incentives to provide frequency and attract connecting passengers.Our main message is that the airport's incentive to use revenue sharing depends on how strongly airlines are privately motivated to provide complementary service quality.Under zero-cost layovers, private frequency incentives are relatively weak, giving the airport a stronger incentive to share non-aeronautical revenue.Under high-cost layovers, the lower-frequency airline determines the effective frequency of the connecting itinerary, strengthening private frequency incentives and leading to a weakly lower optimal revenue-sharing rate.When adopted, revenue sharing increases frequency, lowers fares, and expands passenger traffic, raising airline profits, consumer surplus, and total welfare.These results imply that airport--airline revenue-sharing arrangements should be evaluated in conjunction with the technology of connecting service provision and the incentives it creates for airline service quality.

This study aims to analyze the accuracy of receipts and mechanisms for disbursement of Tax Revenue Sharing funds and Non-Tax Revenue Sharing of the Jambi provincial government in the fiscal year 2015 - 2019. Research is quantitative by using secondary data from the Jambi Provincial Government Budget Realization report for the Fiscal Year 2015 - 2019. Based on the results of the analysis can be concluded that the accuracy of receipts using the formula of efficiency calculation between the budget/target with the realization of balance funds dagi tax revenue sharing and Non-Tax Revenue Sharing in the five years in Jambi Province is inaccurate so as to cause the realization far exceeds or less than the budgeted revenue, and the distribution mechanism is also not on time and often late for reasons of miscalculation so that it must be recalculated, this will result in delays and even unenforceable project activities for regional development.

Mutual funds must recall lent shares to vote, and funds that recall more often earn less per dollar lent. We ask why. In our model, a lending agent learns each fund's propensity to recall and chooses how much special-stock demand to fill from the fund rather than the market. Nash bargaining between the agent and the fund sets the lending revenue split. We solve the bargain in closed form without general collateral and numerically with it. The model predicts that a better recall record raises the special stocks sourced from the fund and its revenue share. Using position-level lending and proxy-voting data on U.S. equity funds, we find that funds that recall more often supply a smaller share of the lending in their special stocks and, at the same lending fees, keep a smaller share of lending revenue. This share accounts for most of their lower income per dollar lent.