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Abstract: Aggregate outcomes can conceal network configurations that expose households to uninsurable risk and require different public services. We study a regulator's joint choice of a corrective activity charge and an information institution in a two-population network game. Although aggregate behavior follows an exact stable law, distinct specialization equilibria require different targeted interventions. With purchased Gaussian monitoring, primitive conditions imply a discontinuous switch between strong regulation without purchased information and informed specialization. The regulator may alternatively obtain signed certification or elicit a privately known state through a report backed by committed random audits. We characterize the three institutions' optimized values and the cost thresholds at which credible disclosure replaces government monitoring. The institutional choice also changes optimal regulation: even when certification and truthful reporting reveal the same state, costly audits favor less specialization and a higher corrective charge. This ordering and monotonicity in audit costs hold under an explicit interiority condition without global concavity of the audit problem. The institutional comparison is solved in the benchmark without feedback from anticipated policy, while the policy switch and strict institutional rankings admit local persistence under additional regularity conditions. Results depend on enforceable verification, restrictions on data access, and an explicitly limited institutional menu.