Stealing Part of a Production Language Model
Authors: Nicholas Carlini, Daniel Paleka, Krishnamurthy Dj Dvijotham, Thomas Steinke, Jonathan Hayase, A. Feder Cooper, Katherine Lee, Matthew Jagielski, Milad Nasr, Arthur Conmy, Eric Wallace, David Rolnick, Florian Tramèr
AI-generated Key Points
- Groundbreaking model-stealing attack can extract precise and nontrivial information from black-box production language models
- Targets the embedding projection layer of transformer models, including popular models like OpenAI's ChatGPT and Google's PaLM-2
- Successfully extracted entire projection matrix of OpenAI's Ada and Babbage language models for less than $20 USD, revealing hidden dimensions of 1024 and 2048 respectively
- Uncovered exact hidden dimension size of gpt-3.5-turbo model through attack methodology, estimating cost under $2,000 in queries to recover entire projection matrix
- Potential vulnerabilities in widely used language models exposed
- Paper discusses potential defenses and mitigations against such attacks, as well as future work to enhance or extend attack methodology
- Collaborative effort of multiple authors underscores significance of research in uncovering security risks associated with black-box language models
Abstract: We introduce the first model-stealing attack that extracts precise, nontrivial information from black-box production language models like OpenAI's ChatGPT or Google's PaLM-2. Specifically, our attack recovers the embedding projection layer (up to symmetries) of a transformer model, given typical API access. For under \$20 USD, our attack extracts the entire projection matrix of OpenAI's Ada and Babbage language models. We thereby confirm, for the first time, that these black-box models have a hidden dimension of 1024 and 2048, respectively. We also recover the exact hidden dimension size of the gpt-3.5-turbo model, and estimate it would cost under \$2,000 in queries to recover the entire projection matrix. We conclude with potential defenses and mitigations, and discuss the implications of possible future work that could extend our attack.
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