What Does It Cost to Force-Close a Lightning Channel? Evidence from 974,000 Channel Closes, 2018-2026
Auteurs : Saurabh Kumar
Résumé scientifique
Bitcoin's Lightning payment network returns the funds of a channel that cannot close cooperatively through pre-signed transactions whose fees and delays fall on its operators. That fee design is being replaced: Bitcoin Core 31.0 removed the mempool rule anchor channels relied on, and the Lightning specification adopted zero-fee commitments in May 2026. What the old design costs has never been measured across fee regimes. We trace every public channel close and every force close on-chain from January 2018 to October 2026, 973,581 closes, and follow each output to its spend. A separate chain index confirms all 698,476 public closes we could compare. Fee spikes did not bring a wave of force closes. Force closes in a spike week and the next were 0.97 times the four weeks before, against 1.02 after ordinary weeks of the same years. A force close costs 2-6 times a cooperative close in fees and locks the closer's balance for days, which outweighs the fees only in low-fee years. When fees are high, pending payments are exposed: in 2023, 18.2% of HTLC timeouts confirmed more than 40 blocks after expiry. Yet since 2021, forwarding nodes lost only 38 payments, each with the preimage already on-chain. Anchor outputs cut late timeouts in fee spikes (20.6% against 30.5%), yet owners rarely bump commitments with them, and miners take most of what third parties sweep. Zero-fee commitments would save only 12% of the anchor mechanism's block space; they should be judged by how promptly payments resolve when fees spike.
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Résumé scientifique
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On the Lifecycle of a Lightning Network Payment Channel étudie les étapes des canaux Lightning ; cet article analyse leurs clôtures et dépenses sur chaîne.
Résumé scientifique
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Optimal Fee Structure for Efficient Lightning Networks examine l’effet des frais sur le routage et l’équilibre des canaux, plutôt que les frais de clôture.
Résumé scientifique
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Résumé scientifique
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Résumé scientifique
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Résumé scientifique
The security of the Lightning Network (LN) relies on the ability of the nodes to close a channel by settling their balances in case of malicious behaviors, which requires confirming a transaction on the Bitcoin blockchain within a pre-agreed time period. We study the susceptibility of the LN to mass exit attacks in case of high transaction congestion on layer-1, in the presence of a small coalition of adversarial nodes that forces a large set of honest users to interact with the blockchain, with the objective of locking or stealing users' funds. We show via simulations that, under historically-plausible congestion conditions, with mild statistical assumptions on channel balances, the propose…
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Résumé scientifique
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Résumé scientifique
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Les travaux antérieurs sur lesquels il s’appuie
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Résumé scientifique
Client diversity is often cited as the Lightning Network's defence against a bug in any one implementation, yet LND runs 80% of public nodes (84% counting one operator's fleet of about 2,000 tiny nodes) and holds 84% of public channel capacity, a capacity share that has barely moved since 2023. We test what diversity buys with a natural experiment. On 26 August 2026, amid security fixes in every implementation, Core Lightning (CLN) maintainers told operators who could not upgrade to disconnect their nodes. Using 805 daily gossip snapshots, 132,360 on-chain channel closes and a client classifier validated against self-identifying aliases and against the wallet that builds each node's funding …
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Résumé scientifique
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Résumé scientifique
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Résumé scientifique
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