Gacha Game: When Prospect Theory Meets Optimal Pricing

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1. Proche Pas pertinent

   From Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based Pricing

   Tan Gan, Nicholas Wu · 2023 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has partial information about the product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. We characterize equilibrium mechanisms of this dynamic informed principal problem. The belief gap between the informed seller and the uninformed buyer, coupled with the buyer's learning, gives rise to mechanisms that provide the skeptical buyer with limited access to the product and an option to upgrade if the buyer is swayed by a good experience. Depending on the seller's screening technology, this takes the form of free/discounted trials or tiered pricing, which are prevalent in digital markets. In c…

2. Proche Pas pertinent

   Optimal Procurement Design: A Reduced Form Approach

   Kun Zhang · 2025 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   Standard procurement models assume that the buyer knows the quality of the good at the time of procurement; however, in many settings, the quality is learned only long after the transaction. We study procurement problems in which the buyer's valuation of the supplied good depends directly on its quality, which is unverifiable and unobservable to the buyer. For a broad class of procurement problems, we identify procurement mechanisms maximizing any weighted average of the buyer's expected payoff and social surplus. The optimal mechanism can be implemented by an auction that restricts sellers to submit bids within specific intervals.

3. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Mechanism Design with Informational Punishment

   Benjamin Balzer, Johannes Schneider · 2022 · Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, 40, pp 197-209 · Pas encore résumé

   Résumé scientifique

   We introduce \emph{informational punishment} to the design of mechanisms that compete with an exogenous status quo mechanism: Players can send garbled public messages with some delay, and others cannot commit to ignoring them. Optimal informational punishment ensures that full participation is without loss, even if any single player can publicly enforce the status quo mechanism. Informational punishment permits using a standard revelation principle, is independent of the mechanism designer's objective, and operates exclusively off the equilibrium path. It is robust to refinements and applies in informed-principal settings. We provide conditions that make it robust to opportunistic signal des…

4. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Platform-Mediated Competition

   Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey · 2020 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   Cross-group externalities and network effects in two-sided platform markets shape market structure and competition policy, and are the subject of extensive study. Less understood are the within-group externalities that arise when the platform designs many-to-many matchings: the value to agent $i$ of matching with agent $j$ may depend on the set of agents with which $j$ is matched. These effects are present in a wide range of settings in which firms compete for individuals' custom or attention. I characterize platform-optimal matchings in a general model of many-to-many matching with within-group externalities. I prove a set of comparative statics results for optimal matchings, and show how t…

5. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Optimal policy design for the sugar tax

   Kelly Geyskens, Alexander Grigoriev, Niels Holtrop et al. · 2018 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   Healthy nutrition promotions and regulations have long been regarded as a tool for increasing social welfare. One of the avenues taken in the past decade is sugar consumption regulation by introducing a sugar tax. Such a tax increases the price of extensive sugar containment in products such as soft drinks. In this article we consider a typical problem of optimal regulatory policy design, where the task is to determine the sugar tax rate maximizing the social welfare. We model the problem as a sequential game represented by the three-level mathematical program. On the upper level, the government decides upon the tax rate. On the middle level, producers decide on the product pricing. On the l…

6. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   The Relationship between Consumer Theories with and without Utility Maximization

   Yuhki Hosoya · 2024 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   To study the assumption that the utility maximization hypothesis implicitly adds to consumer theory, we consider a mathematical representation of pre-marginal revolution consumer theory based on subjective exchange ratios. We introduce two axioms on subjective exchange ratio, and show that both axioms hold if and only if consumer behavior is consistent with the utility maximization hypothesis. Moreover, we express the process for a consumer to find the transaction stopping point in terms of differential equations, and prove that the conditions for its stability are equal to the two axioms introduced in the above argument. Therefore, the consumer can find his/her transaction stopping point if…

7. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Designing binary social decisions

   Kirneva Margarita, Núñez Matías · 2023 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   We design a mechanism, Majority voting with random checks, that fully implements the majority rule for binary social decisions. After a simultaneous vote over the two options, the winner must be confirmed by at least one agent from a random sample of agents voting sequentially. The mechanism incentivizes agents to act truthfully as a lottery is held if no agent confirms the outcome. Our mechanism also reduces by almost half the number of stages required for implementation. Furthermore, we extend our results to incomplete information and abstention and introduce additional implementation mechanisms based on the concept of network formation

8. Apparenté Pas pertinent

   Covert learning and disclosure

   Matteo Escudé · 2023 · Économie théorique · Résumé IA disponible

   Résumé scientifique

   I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. In equilibrium, the sender only influences the receiver by choosing to remain selectively ignorant, rather than by deceiving her about the discoveries. Although deception does not occur, I highlight how deception possibilities determine what information the sender chooses to acquire and transmit. I then turn to comparative statics, characterizing in which sense the sender benefits from her claims being more verifiable, showing this is akin to increasing her commitment power. Finally, I characterize sender- and receiver-optimal falsification environments.