The network of global corporate control
Auteurs : Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, Stefano Battiston
Résumé scientifique
The structure of the control network of transnational corporations affects global market competition and financial stability. So far, only small national samples were studied and there was no appropriate methodology to assess control globally. We present the first investigation of the architecture of the international ownership network, along with the computation of the control held by each global player. We find that transnational corporations form a giant bow-tie structure and that a large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions. This core can be seen as an economic "super-entity" that raises new important issues both for researchers and policy makers.
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This article reviews “The network of global corporate control” by Vitali et al. (2011) where the authors use modern network theory to analyze the centralization of global corporate control. Specifically, they calculate how a central core of transnational corporations (TNCs) have control over the total operating revenue of all transnational corporations. They find that out of 43,060 transnational corporations, 737 top shareholders control about 80 percent of the value of all TNCs. This control is centralized in the financial sector and extends to other sectors of the economy, including manufacturing and services. TNCs are more global than ever before. They are in virtually every country of th…
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Résumé scientifique
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Résumé scientifique
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Résumé scientifique
We present a methodology to extract the backbone of complex networks based on the weight and direction of links, as well as on nontopological properties of nodes. We show how the methodology can be applied in general to networks in which mass or energy is flowing along the links. In particular, the procedure enables us to address important questions in economics, namely, how control and wealth are structured and concentrated across national markets. We report on the first cross-country investigation of ownership networks, focusing on the stock markets of 48 countries around the world. On the one hand, our analysis confirms results expected on the basis of the literature on corporate control,…
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Résumé scientifique
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Résumé scientifique
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Résumé scientifique
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Résumé scientifique
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Les travaux antérieurs sur lesquels il s’appuie
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Résumé scientifique
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Résumé scientifique
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