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Résumé : The paper proposes a dynamic version of the frictionless Becker-Shapley-Shubik marriage matching model with transferable utility. Its primary objective is to develop a tractable model that rationalizes the marriage distribution of ‘who marries whom’ by age. This behavioral dynamic model rationalizes a new marriage matching function. An empirical methodology that relies on the equilibrium outcomes of the model identies the marital preferences over spouses. This framework also allows the inverse problem of computing the vector of aggregate marriages given a new distribution of available single individuals and estimated preferences to be solved. The solution to this inverse problem has been shown to exist under mild conditions. This paper also develops a simple test of the model’s empirical validity. Using aggregate data of new marriages and available single men and women in the US in 1970, 1980 and 1990, I investigate the changes in the gains to marriage over this period.