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Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements

Edward D. Mansfield (University of California, Riverside, University of Southern California), Helen V. Milner (University of California, Riverside, University of Southern California), B. Peter Rosendorff (University of California, Riverside, University of Southern California)

International Organization
DOI: 10.1162/002081802760199863 (Economics, Econometrics and Finance)
Licence : non indiquée (tous droits réservés)

Résumé : Over the past fifty years, barriers to international trade have decreased substantially. A key source of this decline in protectionism has been the proliferation of agreements among countries to liberalize commerce. In this article, we analyze the domestic political conditions under which states have concluded such agreements and, more generally, explore the factors affecting interstate economic cooperation. We argue that interstate cooperation on commercial issues depends heavily on the political regime types of participants: as states become more democratic, they are increasingly likely to conclude trade agreements. To test our claim, we examine whether the regime types of states have influenced their propensity to form and expand preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) during the period since World War II. We find that democratic countries are about twice as likely to form a PTA as autocratic countries, and that pairs of democracies are roughly four times as likely to do so as autocratic pairs. These results provide strong evidence that democracies are more commercially cooperative than less democratic countries.

Publié le 01 Jan. 2002