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Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
Sushil Bikhchandani (California Institute of Technology), S. Chatterji (California Institute of Technology), Ron Lavi (California Institute of Technology), Ahuva Mu’alem (California Institute of Technology), Noam Nisan (California Institute of Technology), Arunava Sen
Résumé : We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compat-ible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent’s type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent.