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Menu Design Meets Market Design: Strategic Simplicity vs. Choice Complexity

Gian Caspari, Paul Ergün Hild, Michael Hilweg-Waldeck, Manshu Khanna, Vincent Meisner

Licence : CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Résumé : Strategic simplicity removes the incentive to misreport preferences, but it does not ensure that participants can identify what they prefer. We study this distinction in a laboratory experiment on serial dictatorships, where optimal play only requires choosing one's favorite bundle of real-effort tasks. Participants make fifteen incentivized choices among bundles that vary in how many tasks they combine. They choose either from a large menu or through a series of binary choices. Having made all choices, they unexpectedly reconsider each assignment against a previously rejected alternative. We find that roughly one in six choices is reversed and almost one in five involves an objectively dominated bundle. Simplifying the choice architecture does not help. Binary decomposition even raises reversal rates among low-ability participants and further inflates their confidence about their choices.

Soumis à arXiv le 13 Nov. 2026