Résultats de recherche pour « Turing Test »

The Turing Test (TT) checks for human intelligence, rather than any putative general intelligence. It involves repeated interaction requiring learning in the form of adaption to the human conversation partner. It is a macro-level post-hoc test in contrast to the definition of a Turing Machine (TM), which is a prior micro-level definition. This raises the question of whether learning is just another computational process, i.e. can be implemented as a TM. Here we argue that learning or adaption is fundamentally different from computation, though it does involve processes that can be seen as computations. To illustrate this difference we compare (a) designing a TM and (b) learning a TM, defining them for the purpose of the argument. We show that there is a well-defined sequence of problems which are not effectively designable but are learnable, in the form of the bounded halting problem. Some characteristics of human intelligence are reviewed including it's: interactive nature, learning abilities, imitative tendencies, linguistic ability and context-dependency. A story that explains some of these is the Social Intelligence Hypothesis. If this is broadly correct, this points to the necessity of a considerable period of acculturation (social learning in context) if an artificial intelligence is to pass the TT. Whilst it is always possible to 'compile' the results of learning into a TM, this would not be a designed TM and would not be able to continually adapt (pass future TTs). We conclude three things, namely that: a purely "designed" TM will never pass the TT; that there is no such thing as a general intelligence since it necessary involves learning; and that learning/adaption and computation should be clearly distinguished.

Progress in language and image understanding by machines has sparkled the interest of the research community in more open-ended, holistic tasks, and refueled an old AI dream of building intelligent machines. We discuss a few prominent challenges that characterize such holistic tasks and argue for "question answering about images" as a particular appealing instance of such a holistic task. In particular, we point out that it is a version of a Turing Test that is likely to be more robust to over-interpretations and contrast it with tasks like grounding and generation of descriptions. Finally, we discuss tools to measure progress in this field.

Today, computer vision systems are tested by their accuracy in detecting and localizing instances of objects. As an alternative, and motivated by the ability of humans to provide far richer descriptions and even tell a story about an image, we construct a "visual Turing test": an operator-assisted device that produces a stochastic sequence of binary questions from a given test image. The query engine proposes a question; the operator either provides the correct answer or rejects the question as ambiguous; the engine proposes the next question ("just-in-time truthing"). The test is then administered to the computer-vision system, one question at a time. After the system's answer is recorded, the system is provided the correct answer and the next question. Parsing is trivial and deterministic; the system being tested requires no natural language processing. The query engine employs statistical constraints, learned from a training set, to produce questions with essentially unpredictable answers-the answer to a question, given the history of questions and their correct answers, is nearly equally likely to be positive or negative. In this sense, the test is only about vision. The system is designed to produce streams of questions that follow natural story lines, from the instantiation of a unique object, through an exploration of its properties, and on to its relationships with other uniquely instantiated objects.

Abstract The Turing Test (TT) is best regarded as a model to test for intelligence, where an entity’s intelligence is inferred from its ability to be attributed with ‘human-likeness’ during a text-based conversation. The problem with this model, however, is that it does not care if or how well an entity produces a meaningful conversation, as long as its interactions are humanlike enough. As a consequence, the TT attracts projects that concentrate on how best to fool the judges. In light of this, I propose a new version of the TT: the Questioning Turing Test (QTT). Here, the entity has to produce an enquiry rather than a conversation; and it is parametrised along two further dimensions in addition to ‘human-likeness’: ‘correctness’, evaluating if the entity accomplishes the enquiry; and ‘strategicness’, evaluating how well the entity accomplishes the enquiry, in terms of the number of questions asked (the fewer, the better).

Turing's famous `machine' model constitutes the first intuitively convincing framework for computing with real numbers. Kleene's computation schemes S1-S9 extend Turing's approach to computing with objects of any finite type. Both frameworks have their pros and cons and it is a natural question if there is an approach that marries the best of both the Turing and Kleene worlds. In answer to this question, we propose a considerable extension of the scope of Turing's approach. Central is a fragment of the Axiom of Choice involving continuous choice functions, going back to Kreisel-Troelstra and intuitionistic analysis. Put another way, we formulate a relation `is computationally stronger than' involving third-order objects that overcomes (many of) the pitfalls of the Turing and Kleene frameworks.

Comparative tests work by finding the difference (or the absence of difference) between a reference subject and an evaluee. The Turing Test, in its standard interpretation, takes (a subset of) the human species as a reference. Motivated by recent findings and developments in the area of machine intelligence evaluation, we discuss what it would be like to have a Turing Test where the reference and the interrogator subjects are replaced by Turing Machines. This question sets the focus on several issues that are usually disregarded when dealing with the Turing Test, such as the degree of intelligence of reference and interrogator, the role of imitation (and not only prediction) in intelligence, its view from the perspective of game theory and others. Around these issues, this paper finally brings the Turing Test to the realm of Turing machines.

Before Alan Turing made his crucial contributions to the theory of computation, he studied the question of whether quantum mechanics could throw light on the nature of free will. This paper investigates the roles of quantum mechanics and computation in free will. Although quantum mechanics implies that events are intrinsically unpredictable, the 'pure stochasticity' of quantum mechanics adds randomness only to decision-making processes, not freedom. By contrast, the theory of computation implies that, even when our decisions arise from a completely deterministic decision-making process, the outcomes of that process can be intrinsically unpredictable, even to-especially to-ourselves. I argue that this intrinsic computational unpredictability of the decision-making process is what gives rise to our impression that we possess free will. Finally, I propose a 'Turing test' for free will: a decision-maker who passes this test will tend to believe that he, she, or it possesses free will, whether the world is deterministic or not.